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The dangers resulting from the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
have been central to the study of international security affairs for much of the past two 
generations. This important volume breaks new ground by moving past a focus on the 
reasons why international actors acquire unconventional weapons. Its editors and 
contributors seek to examine the ways in which "new" proliferators actually use and 
control unconventional weapons for the purposes of attaining their policy objectives. In 
the introductory chapters, the editors set the agenda for empirical analysis by recasting 
three familiar theoretical frameworks (organization theory, realism and strategic culture 
theory) as competing heuristics by which to explain and generate predictions about new 
proliferators' military doctrines and their unconventional weapons command and control 
systems. Generally, organization theory predicts that parochial interests will lead groups 
within states to act to develop doctrines and command and control systems that will 
benefit their organizations. Realism posits that unitary rational actors deal with external 
security threats by developing doctrines and control systems that reflect a desire to 
maximize the likelihood of successfully countering those threats. Different actors 
perceiving different threats adopt different doctrines and, subsequently, different 
command systems for their unconventional weapons. Finally, strategic culture theory 
indicates that domestic factors and cultural constraints, including taboos and moral norms 
against usage, are more important in shaping the actions of leaders than are the rational 
pursuit of similar international security ends or organizational goals; thus, observers 
might expect leaders to develop different doctrines and control systems despite being in 
similar international situations.  
As these theories often predict similar outcomes, the editors recognize the necessity of 
thoroughly examining the causal factors underlying use and control decisions. They use 
comprehensive case studies of seven new proliferators - Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, 
North Korea and the Aum Shinrikyo cult - to comparatively test the applicability of each 
of the frameworks to their doctrines and command systems. A number of important 
general conclusions can be drawn from these informative contributions. Overall, the 
editors posit that classical realism (rather than neorealism, which predicts the 
development of defensive doctrines in defense of the status quo) appears to fare best 
among the theories tested. Actors indeed develop doctrines for both offensive and 
defensive purposes. Further, the labeling of new proliferators as "irrational" is 
misleading. While the desire to kill numerous people may make terrorist groups such as 
Aum seem "crazy," and the willingness of some proliferators to withstand military and 
economic punishment to develop unconventional weapons may make them seem 
"undeterrable," their behavior evinces rational calculation toward the achievement of 
their objectives. The empirical evidence also indicates that the nature of the external 
threats actors face determines the amount of authority leaders are willing to delegate to 
subordinates in the event of a crisis. According to Timothy McCarthy and Jonathan 
Tucker, for instance, Saddam Hussein, despite his highly centralized regime, delegated 
authority to field commanders to use chemical weapons against Israel in case of a 
"nuclear decapitation" attack on Baghdad during the Gulf War. Israeli leaders, who have 
not had to fear such attacks on Tel Aviv, have maintained a firm grasp on Israel's nuclear 
command and control system.  
It is evident, however, that realism does not tell the entire story; both strategic culture and 
organization theories help to address the anomalies left unexplained by realism. One 
observation made throughout the study is that the classification of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" obscures important differences 
among the weapons and the way actors think about them. While both Iraq and North 
Korea consider chemical weapons to be "force multipliers" for conventional weapons 
because of their relative inexpensiveness and battlefield usability, nuclear proliferators 
appear to have treated their arsenals differently. Due to the immense destructive power of 
nuclear weapons, both materialist concerns and strong normative aversions can result in a 
reluctance to develop adequate deployment and usage doctrines, and thus constrain use. 
Indeed, as is evident in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu's and Avner Cohen's studies of Indian 
and Israeli nuclear doctrine and control (respectively), nuclear weapons often are viewed 
as status symbols signifying power to domestic or international audiences, or as usable 
only to ensure state survival. As such, adequate doctrines for credible threat or use may 
remain rudimentary, and this lack of development is due in large part to "non-realist" 
considerations. Additionally, the role of variously successful organizational attempts to 
exercise control over doctrine and command, especially in the cases of the Pakistani 
military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran, indicates that realism's 
unitary actor assumption may not always hold.  
This work is a significant contribution to the study of international politics, and is 
seminal in the analysis of the ways in which the policies of new proliferators reflect their 
views about their domestic and international situations and how their unconventional 
weapons can be used to address those situations. The illustration of the diversity in the 
development of proliferators' doctrines and unconventional weapons control systems is 
invaluable to all students of international politics. For the statesperson, the volume acts as 
an admonition to refrain from treating all proliferators alike; for the scholar, it serves as 
an exceptional example of the analytical robustness that results from a willingness to use 
multiple theoretical approaches to explain complex phenomena.  
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